Your Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation raises a substantive question worth debating: what must be true for finite minds to have knowledge of a supposed infinite ground? But your aargument rests on several undeclared and contestable notions.
Two immediate ones that jump out:
1. You move from "finite minds are limited" to "finite minds cannot know the infinite" without showing why limitedness implies complete epistemic impotence. Are you claiming revelation is necessary for any true belief about God, or only for exhaustive, personal knowledge? Also, on what grounds do you treat "God is infinite" as a neutral starting point rather than a contested metaphysical hypothesis? If it’s inferred, give the chain of reasons; if it’s assumed, admit you’re arguing within classical theism.
2. Give a discrimination procedure. I mean, if revelation is necessary, how do we distinguish genuine revelation from a deceptive transcendent, a psychological episode, cultural projection
The five criteria are plausible desiderata but need operational definitions and comparative tests against rival traditions. Otherwise they read more like a checklist designed to favor the view you already prefer.
First of all, of course i'm arguing within classic theism. I'm a Christian, and just because something is contested does not make it uncertain or something. For God to be a creator, he must be self-sufficient, and therefore he cannot depend on anything this is basic. Thus, he is infinite(Any account of God as creator already commits you to infinity)
Finite mind may have true beliefs but cannot track whether those beliefs make contact. I restated this multiple times in my post.
I've done what you're asking for in the link in my post; they flow logically from the precondition i stated. The comparative analysis is there as well.
Okay, I agree that you're making a truth-tracking claim.
But if finite cognition cannot, in principle, track whether its beliefs make contact with the divine, then revelation doesn't solve the epistemic gap, it merely relocates it. One still needs warrant for thinking that the revelation itself makes contact, that the revealer is truthful rather than deceptive, and that one's reception or interpretation is not distorted.
So a dilemma remains even under divine assistance: Either finite cognition is capable of tracking contact conditions when properly enabled, or it is not.
If it is capable under certain conditions, then the claim that finite minds are epistemically impotent with respect to God is overstated — the relevant cognitive capacity exists, even if you think it requires activation or repair. That therefore weakens the necessity claim that revelation is the only route to God-knowledge in principle.
If finite cognition cannot track contact even when "heightened" then revelation supplies content without warrant. Cognitive elevation does not self-certify. You still owe an account of how the subject knows that the heightening is genuine rather than illusory, deceptive, or psychologically induced.
If the heightened state is detectable and assessable, then finite minds can evaluate contact conditions after all. If it is not detectable, then revelation becomes epistemically indistinguishable from delusion.
Moreover, once cognitive elevation is allowed as a mechanism, competing revelatory traditions are granted prima facie parity unless you can supply a non-question-begging discriminator (and I don't think appealing to criteria derived from classical theism works unless those metaphysical commitments are independently justified)
Finally, you present this as a transcendental argument, but (as you correctly explained in the first few paragraphs) transcendental arguments aim to show what any worldview must presuppose. However, as per your later admission, this is more like an intra-Christian coherence argument than a universal epistemic necessity.
Btw, I'm yet to read the linked post — I will do that later and engage the comparative analysis on its own terms.
As i suspected you're pushing false dilemmas because you don't understand the argument.
At best all you’re trying to do is disprove something you don’t understand or merely argue.
TADR does not say finite cognition is globally incapable of recognizing divine contact. It says finite cognition cannot generate or secure divine reference conditions from its own resources.
Revelation does not “relocate” the epistemic gap because it is not merely new content added to an unchanged subject. It is an asymmetrical act: the infinite initiates contact and enables recognition. That is not self-certification any more than perception or reason is self-certifying; it is recognition under proper conditions.
The demand that the subject independently verify the authenticity of revelation prior to revelation imposes an illicit standard that would undermine all knowledge. Recognition conditions are always internal to the mode of access.
As for parity: rival traditions only enjoy parity before metaphysical analysis. Once you ask whether a given account actually bridges the infinite–finite gap, grounds intelligibility, coheres internally, and enables recognition, parity dissolves.
Finally, you’re right that TADR is conditional. It is a transcendental argument within classical theism i never said it wasn't; it is not a universal argument against all worldviews. But that is sufficient to test Judaism, Islam, Deism, and Christianity on their own stated commitments.
I think this somewhat clarifies the disagreement to some degree but not entirely.
I'm happy to grant your core claim: finite cognition cannot generate or secure divine reference conditions from its own resources. That's still coherent within classical theism.
But the problem I'm pressing is not about generation or whatever — it's about warrant and defeasibility.
You say revelation enables recognition under proper conditions, analogously to perception. But perception works epistemically because it is embedded in a shared causal environment with public correction mechanisms, intersubjective calibration, and identifiable defeaters. Revelation, as you describe it, lacks those features.
So the question isn't whether recognition must be "independently verified prior to access" — that's a strawman. The question is: what would count against a putative revelation once access has occurred?
If the answer is "nothing internal to the subject" then recognition collapses into sincerity or phenomenology. If the answer is "external coherence with a metaphysical framework" then warrant is theory-dependent and does not privilege revelation over rival traditions that report analogous recognition under their own frameworks.
This is why parity doesn't dissolve by assertion. Your criteria presuppose classical theism and then test traditions for conformity to it. That may show Christianity's internal coherence, but it does not establish revelation as a uniquely truth-tracking mode rather than a framework-relative one.
So my challenge isn't that revelation cannot enable recognition; it's that you haven't shown how such recognition is reliability-conferring rather than merely self-authenticating, nor how error is even possible on your model.
Your Transcendental Argument for Divine Revelation raises a substantive question worth debating: what must be true for finite minds to have knowledge of a supposed infinite ground? But your aargument rests on several undeclared and contestable notions.
Two immediate ones that jump out:
1. You move from "finite minds are limited" to "finite minds cannot know the infinite" without showing why limitedness implies complete epistemic impotence. Are you claiming revelation is necessary for any true belief about God, or only for exhaustive, personal knowledge? Also, on what grounds do you treat "God is infinite" as a neutral starting point rather than a contested metaphysical hypothesis? If it’s inferred, give the chain of reasons; if it’s assumed, admit you’re arguing within classical theism.
2. Give a discrimination procedure. I mean, if revelation is necessary, how do we distinguish genuine revelation from a deceptive transcendent, a psychological episode, cultural projection
The five criteria are plausible desiderata but need operational definitions and comparative tests against rival traditions. Otherwise they read more like a checklist designed to favor the view you already prefer.
This feels like you didn’t read the post at all
First of all, of course i'm arguing within classic theism. I'm a Christian, and just because something is contested does not make it uncertain or something. For God to be a creator, he must be self-sufficient, and therefore he cannot depend on anything this is basic. Thus, he is infinite(Any account of God as creator already commits you to infinity)
Finite mind may have true beliefs but cannot track whether those beliefs make contact. I restated this multiple times in my post.
I've done what you're asking for in the link in my post; they flow logically from the precondition i stated. The comparative analysis is there as well.
Okay, I agree that you're making a truth-tracking claim.
But if finite cognition cannot, in principle, track whether its beliefs make contact with the divine, then revelation doesn't solve the epistemic gap, it merely relocates it. One still needs warrant for thinking that the revelation itself makes contact, that the revealer is truthful rather than deceptive, and that one's reception or interpretation is not distorted.
So a dilemma remains even under divine assistance: Either finite cognition is capable of tracking contact conditions when properly enabled, or it is not.
If it is capable under certain conditions, then the claim that finite minds are epistemically impotent with respect to God is overstated — the relevant cognitive capacity exists, even if you think it requires activation or repair. That therefore weakens the necessity claim that revelation is the only route to God-knowledge in principle.
If finite cognition cannot track contact even when "heightened" then revelation supplies content without warrant. Cognitive elevation does not self-certify. You still owe an account of how the subject knows that the heightening is genuine rather than illusory, deceptive, or psychologically induced.
If the heightened state is detectable and assessable, then finite minds can evaluate contact conditions after all. If it is not detectable, then revelation becomes epistemically indistinguishable from delusion.
Moreover, once cognitive elevation is allowed as a mechanism, competing revelatory traditions are granted prima facie parity unless you can supply a non-question-begging discriminator (and I don't think appealing to criteria derived from classical theism works unless those metaphysical commitments are independently justified)
Finally, you present this as a transcendental argument, but (as you correctly explained in the first few paragraphs) transcendental arguments aim to show what any worldview must presuppose. However, as per your later admission, this is more like an intra-Christian coherence argument than a universal epistemic necessity.
Btw, I'm yet to read the linked post — I will do that later and engage the comparative analysis on its own terms.
As i suspected you're pushing false dilemmas because you don't understand the argument.
At best all you’re trying to do is disprove something you don’t understand or merely argue.
TADR does not say finite cognition is globally incapable of recognizing divine contact. It says finite cognition cannot generate or secure divine reference conditions from its own resources.
Revelation does not “relocate” the epistemic gap because it is not merely new content added to an unchanged subject. It is an asymmetrical act: the infinite initiates contact and enables recognition. That is not self-certification any more than perception or reason is self-certifying; it is recognition under proper conditions.
The demand that the subject independently verify the authenticity of revelation prior to revelation imposes an illicit standard that would undermine all knowledge. Recognition conditions are always internal to the mode of access.
As for parity: rival traditions only enjoy parity before metaphysical analysis. Once you ask whether a given account actually bridges the infinite–finite gap, grounds intelligibility, coheres internally, and enables recognition, parity dissolves.
Finally, you’re right that TADR is conditional. It is a transcendental argument within classical theism i never said it wasn't; it is not a universal argument against all worldviews. But that is sufficient to test Judaism, Islam, Deism, and Christianity on their own stated commitments.
I think this somewhat clarifies the disagreement to some degree but not entirely.
I'm happy to grant your core claim: finite cognition cannot generate or secure divine reference conditions from its own resources. That's still coherent within classical theism.
But the problem I'm pressing is not about generation or whatever — it's about warrant and defeasibility.
You say revelation enables recognition under proper conditions, analogously to perception. But perception works epistemically because it is embedded in a shared causal environment with public correction mechanisms, intersubjective calibration, and identifiable defeaters. Revelation, as you describe it, lacks those features.
So the question isn't whether recognition must be "independently verified prior to access" — that's a strawman. The question is: what would count against a putative revelation once access has occurred?
If the answer is "nothing internal to the subject" then recognition collapses into sincerity or phenomenology. If the answer is "external coherence with a metaphysical framework" then warrant is theory-dependent and does not privilege revelation over rival traditions that report analogous recognition under their own frameworks.
This is why parity doesn't dissolve by assertion. Your criteria presuppose classical theism and then test traditions for conformity to it. That may show Christianity's internal coherence, but it does not establish revelation as a uniquely truth-tracking mode rather than a framework-relative one.
So my challenge isn't that revelation cannot enable recognition; it's that you haven't shown how such recognition is reliability-conferring rather than merely self-authenticating, nor how error is even possible on your model.
That's the epistemic gap I don't yet see closed.
Some mad things are going on and I'm here for it 🤣.